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 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stands over a 
pile of memorandums and notes detailing the past day’s events 
in a jungle on the other side of the world.  To him these events 
occur as he reads them.  Until he or his staff reads these bul-
letins, soldiers – who in another world have been dead for a day 
– are alive in their home country.  He contemplates putting the 
pile in the fireplace in his boss’s office, sparing the dead who 
were killed at the hand of the enemy a second death at home.
 Another time, and a world apart, Secretary of Defense 
Richard Cheney watches a satellite feed from CNN of his coun-
try’s armed forces celebrating an overwhelming victory only 
one hundred hours after the true conflict began.  Though his 
Western Excursion never materialized he stands strong with a 
feeling of confidence in his fellow civilian and military leaders 
(Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 368).  They have learned the lessons re-
quired of them as the leaders of a new, post-Cold War America. 
But what lessons had America taken out of the Vietnam deba-
cle?  How was the strategy used in Desert Storm a direct result 
of these lessons?  And finally, what lessons have the civilian-
controlled American military taken out of Vietnam that could 
serve as the antidote to poisoned relations experienced during 
the late 1960’s and the whole of the 1970’s (Weigley, 1993, p. 56)?
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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear 
the result of a hundred battles.  If you know yourself and not 
your enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a 
defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will 
succumb in every battle.” (Tzu, 2003, p. 17)
 From his office in Washington, President Lyndon John-
son was literally half a world away from the events of Vietnam. 
This situation is inherent given that one cannot through will 
or work rearrange the continents.  But Johnson was at this 
same moment in June of 1965, half a world away from under-
standing that there existed a great divide between the war his 
military was losing, and the war being waged by the North Viet-
namese and Vietcong. This distance was no one’s fault but his.
 The failure to understand the motives behind the war in 
Vietnam was a major undoing for Johnson’s military campaign. 
Johnson and his staff saw the action in Vietnam as conducive to 
the greater struggle against Communism the world over.  Ho Chi 
Minh was a puppet of China and the Soviet Union, and America 
stood alone to prevent the dominoes from beginning a chain re-
action into tyranny.  Of course, no one told the Vietnamese this. 
From the first rumbles of war in the late 1950’s, Ho Chi Minh’s 
forces saw the United States as a new colonial power, coming to 
replace the French and force the Vietnamese people back into 
submission beneath their boot (Morris, 2004).  America strug-
gled desperately to keep the direct combat in Vietnam some-
where less than a “real war,” and still give the United States a 
façade of strength against Communism (Clancy & Horner, 2000, 
p. 88).  At the same time, and on the same fields of battle, the 
North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong insurgency continued an 
already twenty year old struggle against foreign colonial powers. 
 This lesson was hard in the mind of the executive 
branch and the military during Desert Storm.  General Norman 
Schwartzkopf commanded all United States forces in Iraq dur-
ing Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  In doing so, he worked 
closely with Secretary of State Cheney as well as Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell to ensure that every angle 
of the operations in the Middle East would step on as few toes 
as possible.  The Coalition was to function in two regards.  The 
broader Coalition’s (including Arab states) function was to house 
and give a base to the combat troops, while the troops would 
serve in Desert Shield to prevent Hussein from further invad-
ing the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 332).  These combat troops consisted of 
American, British, and French soldiers.  The reasoning was that 
if Israel were to act, the Coalition would break down, leaving the 
combat troops with nowhere from which to stage their eventual 
attack to liberate Kuwait.  President Bush and his cabinet, along 
with the Joint Chiefs explored other possible scenarios that 
could lead to disaster.  Had one or any Arab state been asked 
to participate militarily in the liberation of Kuwait, the Coali-
tion would have collapsed due to cultural standards of conduct. 
If Secretary of Defense Cheney’s more adventurous plan (re-
ferred to earlier as the Western Excursion) been allowed to be 
carried out, and Baghdad and other cities within the border of 
Iraq were attacked or captured, the Coalition would have col-
lapsed.  Also, had the United States decided to attack Baghdad, 
it is speculated that France would not have participated in the 
fighting.  Because of the Geneva and Hague Conventions the 
United States would be responsible also for the costs of a mili-
tary occupation and the war could have lasted for many years 
after the initial invasion in 1991 (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 498).
 President Johnson’s mishandling of the reasoning be-
hind Vietnam severely inhibited the country’s ability to see a 
clear objective to aim for.  The United States as a whole, as well 
as Vietnam, did not understand enough about the general sce-
nario they were fighting in to have any chance of winning.  In 
Desert Storm, the troops and leadership had a clear under-
standing of what scenario they were entering when they be-
gan planning Desert Shield and Desert Storm.  It is important 
that the leadership behind both sides of a war understand what 
situation they are in, and understand it from both sides.  It is 
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not, however, enough to understand only where a nation stands 
as it comes to a war situation.  The United States must have a 
clear objective in battle, a point after which combat is no longer 
needed and the troops and leadership can begin coming home 
to victory parades and the warm embrace of their loved ones.
“There is no instance of a country having benefited from 
prolonged warfare.” (Tzu, 2003, p. 12)
 Before his untimely assassination in November of 1963, 
John F. Kennedy planned to remove all 16,000 military advi-
sors from Vietnam within two years (Morris, 2004).  After his as-
sassination, however, President Johnson decided that his view, 
which was kept quiet in the past, was now to be the view of 
the nation:  “You can have more war or more appeasement” 
(Morris, 2004).  Johnson did not establish an end goal or ob-
jective.  His staff and military leadership were silent when 
Johnson presented flawed plans for the continuation and es-
calation of the war (Clancy & Horner, 2000, p. 87).  McNamara 
attempted to explain Operation: Rolling Thunder – the largest 
bombing campaign in the history of the world – as an attempt 
to win the “hearts and minds” of the people of South Vietnam by 
“guaranteeing their security” (Morris, 2004).  But the bombing, 
meant to devastate the North Vietnamese into submission, may 
have seemed pragmatic to a President unsure about the idea 
of mass American casualties on the ground.  But it was an un-
sound strategy to bomb an enemy already hardened by decades 
of war. Had the Joint Chiefs done their job as military strate-
gists, they would have called for the invasion and destruction of 
North Vietnam on the ground (Clancy & Horner, 2000, p. 103).
Though Johnson went into Vietnam with no long-term plans to 
leave, nor with any real handle on the basics of modern warfare, 
the situation only deteriorated once American troops had landed 
and were fighting in the jungles.  Secretary of Defense McNama-
ra’s plan of “Graduated Pressure” – basically a plan best charac-
terized by America’s flexing technological muscle – attempted to 
persuade the North Vietnamese that they could not win (Clancy 
& Horner, 2000, p. 85).  But with no objective in sight, and with 
Ho Chi Minh’s strategy to beat America by out lasting instead 
of out killing her, McNamara’s attempt to minimize the amount 
of force used failed miserably (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 181). 
 When the Coalition of Western and Middle Eastern 
powers began planning what would eventually be known as 
Desert Storm, there was never a second of doubt as to the ob-
jective.  General Schwartzkopf was to remove Saddam Husse-
in’s forces from Kuwait, and reestablish Coalition control of the 
state.  The only occupation of Iraq was to last until the safety 
of Kuwait could be guaranteed (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 386). 
Where President Johnson’s failed air campaign required more 
bomb tonnage than was used in the whole of Western Europe 
during World War II (Morris, 2004), President George H.W. 
Bush was able to employ advanced precision technology to lim-
it collateral damage and ensure the destruction of those targets 
deemed necessary by General Schwartzkopf and the Air Force 
(Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 318).  By destroying command targets, 
the Iraqi army had no chance of organizing against the wave of 
Coalition ground forces that followed the massive air campaign.
Though the United States clearly learned its lesson about defin-
ing and understanding the objectives and enemy in a conflict, not 
every mistake of Vietnam was fully corrected in Desert Storm.
“The sight of men whispering together in small knots or 
speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the 
rank and file.” (Tzu, 2003 p.40)
 Throughout Johnson’s presidency, he and Secretary of 
Defense McNamara gave specific orders to the generals in charge 
of the military as to specifically which targets to bomb on any 
given day (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 368).  This situation in Washing-
ton created very low morale, especially among pilots, in Vietnam. 
 The targets chosen by President Johnson were political 
targets, not meant to be strategically important.  Instead these 
targets were meant to force the North Vietnamese into submis-
sion.  The situation became so bizarre that Johnson set new 
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rules of engagement that deemed not only North Vietnamese 
supply camps and warehouses off-limits to American aircraft, 
but also enemy airfields as well (Clancy & Horner, 2000, p. 88).
When pilots were told they could not preemptively destroy 
the same fighters that would soon take to the sky and attack 
them, a new unwritten system emerged.  Pilots would inten-
tionally bomb targets that they found to be more strategical-
ly important than the mission given, and then report that all 
munitions had successfully been launched at the originally 
assigned target.  The pilot would also report that he did not 
have a successful view of damages to report, and later that 
day reconnaissance photos would show the original target 
intact, and mysteriously, a nearby target of strategic impor-
tance completely destroyed (Clancy & Horner, 2000, p. 98). 
In the interim period between Vietnam and Desert Storm, a 
significant piece of legislation, known as the Goldwater-Nich-
ols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1 October 
1986, gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff the right to participate 
in any and all deliberations of the National Security Coun-
cil (Weigley, 1993, p. 57).  In doing so, the legislature pre-
vented much of the top-down policy making that led to the 
silence of the members of the Joint Chiefs during Vietnam.
In Desert Storm, this problem of overwhelming control by the 
President and his cabinet was mostly resolved, but as alluded 
to earlier, one major mishap occurred, reminding all in com-
mand of the military of the not-so ‘good old days of Vietnam.’ 
 In late October, 1990, General Schwartzkopf received 
a message from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin 
Powell that Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney had submit-
ted a new plan of attack.  Named “The Western Excursion” by 
Army analysts, this plan involved invading Iraq from the west, 
capturing a city in Iraq, and holding it for ransom until Hussein 
pulled out of Kuwait.  Not only was this plan strategically and 
tactically unsound, it would have also destroyed the Coalition 
because it was so far reaching into Iraq territory.  Although the 
plan was eventually dropped, Cheney and the rest of the cabinet 
brought “The Western Excursion” back multiple times, revised 
but still too risky to the Coalition (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 368).
 Aside from the western excursion, each entity func-
tioned within its correct realm of control:  The Presi-
dent set the political goals, the Secretary of Defense set 
the general military policies, and the military handled 
the plans for the ground war (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 368).
“All warfare is based on deception.” (Tzu, 2003 p. 9)
The dishonesty displayed by pilots in Vietnam could be con-
strued as a lack of honor.  But this dishonest behavior was in-
stead the expression of frustration by subordinates prevented 
from doing what they feel is their best duty to win the war. 
And while one person’s perspective may not always be correct, 
generally the person closest to the event in question has a bet-
ter feel for what is needed to improve the current situation. 
 The dishonest behavior in Vietnam was not limited to 
pilots however.  Officially, the ground war in Vietnam began af-
ter the destroyer Maddox was shelled by the North Vietnamese 
on 2 August 1965 (Morris, 2004).  Johnson took this opportunity 
to ask Congress for the power to wage war, which was grant-
ed to him in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 7 August 1964.
 The Gulf of Tonkin incident may seem like proper justi-
fication for the beginning of a ground war, especially when con-
sidering Johnson’s perspective that the shelling was the forced 
escalation that would not end without a clear victor (Morris, 2004). 
 The tapes from the Johnson White House, howev-
er, paint a different picture.  On 10 March 1964, five months 
before Tonkin, Johnson is quoted as saying “I want… plans 
to trap… [and to] kill some of them.  That is what I want to 
do.”  To which McNamara replied “I’ll try and bring some-
thing back that will meet that objective (Morris, 2004).”
 The feeling that America was being mislead by its lead-
ership abounded during the years of Vietnam.  The Pentagon 
papers raised questions as to whether Johnson deceived the 
people of the United States when he brought the country to 
Vietnam.  The loss of citizen support that followed had the same 
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impact as “being rejected by one’s parents (Schwartzkopf, 1992, 
p. 181).”  Schwartzkopf also attributes the overall disenchant-
ment of the soldiers and civilians during Vietnam to the fabri-
cated body counts and unceasingly optimistic view of a distant 
“light at the end of the tunnel (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 344).” 
The images of frustration among soldiers that made the nightly 
news helped to fuel the destruction of the army’s public image 
(Clancy & Franks, 1998, p. 85).  It was this unrest at home that was 
predicted by Ho Chi Minh as the best course to victory: “We’re 
going to win the war against America the same way we won the 
war against the French: not on the battlefield but in the enemy’s 
homeland (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 181).”  This quote mirrors the 
words of General Fred Franks (ret.): “[America was] an army 
never defeated on the battlefield (Clancy & Franks, 1998, p. 85).” 
 The support for American soldiers in Iraq never ceased 
during Desert Storm.  President George H.W. Bush made it a clear 
priority to build a strong case and strong coalition for the war.  The 
American citizens still weary from Vietnam two decades earlier 
overcame their hesitation towards war, and learned to “separate 
the politics” of a war situation from their concern for the safety 
and morale of the soldiers involved (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 379).
 “On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with 
your allies.” (Tzu, 2003, p. 48)
 President Bush made it a point to get the United Na-
tions behind him. The nine UN resolutions that the Coalition 
received allowing military action against Iraq added an inter-
national legitimacy that Vietnam never possessed.  Vietnam 
was a completely unilateral war.  America made Vietnam the 
location of its next great stand against Communism, but had 
no allies standing with it against the will of the Vietnamese 
people.  “If you cannot convince allies of similar values of the 
merit of a cause, you should reconsider your reasoning (Morris, 
2004).”  Johnson’s America never took the time to reexamine 
the reasoning behind the war in Vietnam, which could have 
prevented some of the confusion over the objectives of the war.
The reasoning from Washington during Desert Storm, howev-
er, needed no reexamination.  Iraqi president Saddam Hussein 
attempted to frame the coming war between the Coalition of 
the United States, Great Britain and France as nothing more 
than an attack by friends of Israel.  Hussein alleged that the 
Coalition intended not to free Kuwait from the grips of a for-
eign power but instead to attack and destroy the only Arab state 
willing and able to destroy Israel (Schwartskopf 498).  Despite 
this attempt to disrupt the greater Coalition, which included 
the above mentioned states as well as Saudi Arabia and oth-
er Arab powers, Hussein was unable to break the bonds that 
had been forged by a multilateral diplomatic plan of action.
 
“It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s 
one, to surround him; if five to one, attack him… If equally 
matched we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we 
can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee 
from him.” (Tzu, 2003, p. 16)
 Graduated Pressure, mentioned in passing earlier, was 
the hallmark of McNamarian warfare.  Secretary McNamara was 
appointed after the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960.  As of 
October 1963, 16,000 American troops dotted the landscape of 
Vietnam in the role of military advisor.  It was Kennedy’s com-
mitment to remove them all within two years (Morris, 2004).  Af-
ter the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, 
President Johnson decided to continue the “commitment to Viet-
namese freedom (Morris, 2004)” that the United States has made 
under President Dwight D. Eisenhower half a decade earlier. 
 After the Gulf of Tonkin resolution allowed Op-
eration: Rolling Thunder to occur, Johnson is heard on 
the White House tapes on 26 February 1965 contemplat-
ing the war as a game “in the fourth quarter, and… 78 to 
nothing. [But I am] scared of ground forces, and I am also 
scared of losing planes for lack of security (Morris, 2004).” 
 By 10 June 1965, Johnson had given the order for thirteen 
battalions to make the move to Vietnam.  General Westmoreland, 
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Commander of all American forces in Vietnam, asked for an ad-
ditional ten battalions.  McNamara suggested to President John-
son that Westmoreland receive at most an additional five (Morris, 
2004).  McNamara’s resistance to move manpower to Vietnam en 
masse resulted in a slow start in the beginning stages of the war. 
 Beyond the simple lack of manpower in the region, 
the complex rules of engagement mentioned earlier made it 
physically impossible to prevent North Vietnamese reinforce-
ments from arriving in the south.  Though under President 
Nixon the military did eventually bomb and invade Cambodia, 
through which the so-called “Ho Chi Minh trail” ran, by that 
time the war was already too long lost (Clancy & Franks, 1998).
 The failure of Graduated Pressure was in the front of 
the minds of the leadership during Desert Storm.  In the six 
month buildup of forces during Desert Shield, 300,000 Ameri-
can troops gathered and prepared for the liberation of Ku-
wait.  It took nearly four years of combat for the same number 
of Americans to reach Vietnam (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 391). 
 The bizarre rules of engagement during Vietnam prevent-
ed the military from accomplishing its objectives.  Sites in North 
Vietnam such as airfields and warehouses were off-limits (Clancy 
& Horner, 2000, p. 88).  In Iraq, the Coalition air force was charged 
with not only preventing defensive attacks from Iraqi jets, but 
also with the destruction of significant airfields and many other 
logistically significant buildings (Clancy & Horner, 2000, p. 504). 
 The strategy in Vietnam was to bomb North Vietnam 
into submission.  In Desert Storm the Coalition used “Shock 
and Awe” tactics and precision attack aircraft to destroy the 
command and control structure of Iraq, basically decapitating 
the enemy command, while sparing civilian casualties.  Without 
the ability to contact the units under his command, a general 
is useless.  And after the power grid, air defense network, and 
radio towers were destroyed in Iraq, there were many useless 
generals in the Iraqi military (Clancy & Horner, 2000, p. 504). 
When the Iraqi army was cut off and surrounded to the satis-
faction of the Coalition leadership, the ground forces of the Co-
alition struck together with the endorsement of the free world 
(through UN resolutions) and removed Saddam Hussein’s army 
from Kuwait in less than five days (Schwartzkopf, 1992, p. 498).
 The success of the Coalition and of America in Desert 
Storm is undeniably linked to the United States’ experience in 
Vietnam.  Many harsh lessons were learned about the new face of 
warfare after World War II.  But lessons were also learned about the 
reenergized struggle between civilian leadership’s commitments 
to politically acceptable solutions to conflict and the military’s 
commitments to sound strategic and tactical decision-making. 
Desert Storm combined the brute and overwhelming force that 
Vietnam lacked, with a set of rules of engagement and objec-
tives that were attainable without unnecessary risk and with-
out extracted combat.  The command structure of the United 
States held up well, with the President and his cabinet mak-
ing the policies that the Joint Chiefs and generals in the field 
followed in preparing for the liberation.  The objective was 
completed swiftly, with minimal casualties, and most impor-
tantly, it was completed fully.  There should exist no linger-
ing regrets in the minds of the leaders during Desert Storm.
 Today the United States is once again fighting in Iraq. 
But some of the lessons learned through the blood of Ameri-
can boys in Vietnam are not currently being heeded by Amer-
ica’s leadership.  A Coalition of a handful of countries and a 
UN resolution gained through false evidence does not make 
a true endorsement.  After all, if America cannot convince 
other countries with similar values of the justness of our cause, 
perhaps it is time to reexamine our reasoning (Morris, 2004).
“Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general 
full of caution.  This is the way to keep a country at peace and 
an army intact.” (Tzu, 2003, p.57)
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 8:00 A.M. August 17, 2001, Big Mountain, AZ. The land is 
barren and wasted; the plastic tape looped around the property 
reads POLICE LINE DO NOT CROSS.  Altars, sweat lodges, a sun-
dance arbor, and a sacred cottonwood tree are demolished, and 
the trample dremains of tobacco ties, prayer flags, eagle feathers, 
and flesh offerings are scattered across the ground. Police cars, trail-
er vehicles, and a front-end loader are parked outside the mess.
       This desolation is all that remains of Camp Ana Mae, 
which earlier that morning had been the site of the 16th annual 
Navajo sundance at Big Mountain, on Hopi-partitioned territory. 
During predawn hours of morning, the Hopi Land Commission 
entered the camp and destroyed the religious ceremony site 
with a front-end loader, wood chipper, and chain saws (Zoellner, 
2001). Several Navajo “trespassers” at the ceremony site were ar-
rested by the Hopi police. Earlier in the week, five elderly female 
ceremony participants had been arrested for entering Camp 
Ana Mae without Hopi government permission (Ghioto, 2001).
 In a response to the destruction, Navajo Nation Presi-
dent Kelsey Begaye stated that “The Hopi government appears 
to be persecuting these families for their religious beliefs, 
as well as for their heartfelt desire to stay on their ancestral 
lands and to continue their traditional ways” and demand-
ed for the Hopi government to apologize for their “violent 
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